Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
JUSTIN KIM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
S246911 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Four 
B278642 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC539194 
 
 
March 12, 2020 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 



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1 
KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
S246911 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
This case presents an issue of first impression:  Do 
employees lose standing to pursue a claim under the Labor Code 
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA; Lab. Code, § 2698 
et seq.) 1  if they settle and dismiss their individual claims for 
Labor Code violations?  We conclude the answer is no.  
Settlement of individual claims does not strip an aggrieved 
employee of standing, as the state’s authorized representative, 
to pursue PAGA remedies. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. 
Legal Overview 
 
California’s Labor Code contains a number of provisions 
designed to protect the health, safety, and compensation of 
workers.  Employers who violate these statutes may be sued by 
employees for damages or statutory penalties.  (See, e.g., § 203; 
see also Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 1094, 1103-1104 [distinguishing wages from statutory 
penalties].)  Statutory penalties, including double or treble 
damages, provide recovery to the plaintiff beyond actual losses 
incurred.  (Murphy, at p. 1104.)  Several Labor Code statutes 
provide for additional civil penalties, generally paid to the state 
unless otherwise provided.  (E.g., § 225.5.)  Before PAGA’s 
                                        
1   
All statutory references are to the Labor Code unless 
otherwise stated. 



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KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
enactment, only the state could sue for civil penalties.  (Iskanian 
v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 
378 (Iskanian).)  A few Labor Code violations are punishable as 
criminal misdemeanors.  (E.g., § 215.) 
 
Government enforcement proved problematic.  As to 
criminal violations, local prosecutors often directed their 
resources to other priorities.  (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 
p. 379.)  The Labor Commissioner and other agencies were 
likewise hampered in their enforcement of civil penalties by 
inadequate funding and staffing constraints.  (Ibid.)  To 
facilitate broader enforcement, the Legislature enacted PAGA, 
authorizing “aggrieved employees” to pursue civil penalties on 
the state’s behalf.  (§ 2699, subd. (a); see Williams v. Superior 
Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545 (Williams).)  “Of the civil 
penalties recovered, 75 percent goes to the Labor and Workforce 
Development Agency, leaving the remaining 25 percent for the 
‘aggrieved employees.’ ”  (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 969, 980-981 (Arias).) 
 
An employee seeking PAGA penalties must notify the 
employer and the Labor and Workforce Development Agency 
(LWDA) of the specific labor violations alleged, along with the 
facts 
and 
theories 
supporting 
the 
claim. 
 
(§ 2699.3, 
subd. (a)(1)(A); see Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 981.)  If the 
agency does not investigate, does not issue a citation, or fails to 
respond to the notice within 65 days, the employee may sue.  
(§ 2699.3, subd. (a)(2).)  The notice requirement allows the 
relevant state agency “to decide whether to allocate scarce 
resources to an investigation.”  (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
p. 546.) 



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KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
 
A PAGA claim is legally and conceptually different from 
an employee’s own suit for damages and statutory penalties.  An 
employee suing under PAGA “does so as the proxy or agent of 
the state’s labor law enforcement agencies.”  (Arias, supra, 46 
Cal.4th at p. 986, italics added.)  Every PAGA claim is “a dispute 
between an employer and the state.”  (Iskanian, supra, 59 
Cal.4th at p. 386; see id. at p. 384; Arias, at p. 986.)  Moreover, 
the civil penalties a PAGA plaintiff may recover on the state’s 
behalf are distinct from the statutory damages or penalties that 
may be available to employees suing for individual violations.  
(Iskanian, at p. 381.)  Relief under PAGA is designed primarily 
to benefit the general public, not the party bringing the action.  
(Arias, at p. 986; Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 197 
Cal.App.4th 489, 501 (Brown).)  “A PAGA representative action 
is therefore a type of qui tam action,” conforming to all 
“traditional criteria, except that a portion of the penalty goes not 
only to the citizen bringing the suit but to all employees affected 
by the Labor Code violation.”  (Iskanian, at p. 382.)  The 
“government entity on whose behalf the plaintiff files suit is 
always the real party in interest.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Not every private citizen can serve as the state’s 
representative.  Only an aggrieved employee has PAGA 
standing.  (§ 2699, subd. (a); Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 
1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003, 
1005 (Amalgamated Transit).)  An “aggrieved employee” is 
defined as “any person who was employed by the alleged violator 
and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was 
committed.”  (§ 2699, subd. (c); hereafter § 2699(c).) 2   We have 
                                        
2   
A “violation” is defined as “a failure to comply with any 
requirement of the code.”  (§ 22.) 



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KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
held that employee unions lack standing to bring PAGA claims 
because the associations are not “employed by” the defendants.  
(§ 2699(c); see Amalgamated Transit, at pp. 1004-1005.)  Here, 
plaintiff Justin Kim settled his own Labor Code claims against 
defendant Reins International California, Inc. (Reins).  The 
question is whether he retains standing to prosecute a 
representative PAGA claim. 
B. 
Facts of this Case 
 
Reins operates restaurants in California and employed 
Kim as a “training manager,” a position it classified as exempt 
from overtime laws.  Kim later sued Reins in a putative class 
action, claiming he and other training managers had been 
misclassified.  The operative complaint alleged causes of action 
for failure to pay wages and overtime (§ 1194); failure to provide 
meal and rest breaks (§ 226.7); failure to provide accurate wage 
statements (§ 226, subd. (a)); waiting time penalties (§ 203); and 
unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200).  It also sought 
civil penalties under PAGA (§ 2699).  
 
Based on an agreement Kim signed when he was hired, 
Reins moved to compel arbitration of the “individual claims” for 
Kim’s own damages.  The motion also sought to dismiss the class 
claims and stay the PAGA claim until arbitration was complete.  
Reins acknowledged that the PAGA claim could not be waived 
(see Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 382-384) or arbitrated 
under the parties’ agreement.  The court dismissed Kim’s class 
claims and ordered arbitration of all remaining claims except 
the PAGA claim and the injunctive relief portion of the unfair 
competition claim.  The PAGA litigation was stayed until 
arbitration was complete.  Several months later, Reins served a 
statutory offer to settle all of Kim’s “individual claims” for 



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KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
$20,000, attorney’s fees, and costs.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 998.)  
Kim accepted.  In exchange, Kim dismissed his individual 
claims, leaving only the PAGA claim for resolution.  
 
With the stay lifted, Reins successfully moved for 
summary adjudication on the ground that Kim lacked standing.  
Reasoning that Kim’s rights had been “completely redressed” by 
the settlement and dismissal of his own claims, the court 
concluded Kim was no longer an “ ‘aggrieved employee’ ” with 
PAGA standing.  Judgment was entered for Reins 3  and affirmed 
on appeal.  We granted review to determine whether Kim’s 
settlement of individual Labor Code claims extinguished his 
PAGA standing. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
A standing requirement ensures that “courts will decide 
only actual controversies between parties with a sufficient 
interest in the subject matter of the dispute to press their case 
with vigor.”  (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 
Cal.3d 432, 439.)  When, as here, a cause of action is based on 
statute, standing rests on the provision’s language, its 
underlying purpose, and the legislative intent.  (See Osborne v. 
Yasmeh (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1127.) 
A. 
Interpretation of PAGA’s Standing Provision 
 
“In construing a statute, our task is to ascertain the intent 
of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the 
enactment.  [Citation.]  We look first to the words of the statute, 
                                        
3   
After granting the summary adjudication motion, the 
court dismissed the action in its entirety.  This appeal does not 
challenge the dismissal of Kim’s previously stayed claim for 
injunctive relief. 



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KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
which are the most reliable indications of the Legislature’s 
intent.  [Citation.]  We construe the words of a statute in context, 
and harmonize the various parts of an enactment by considering 
the provision at issue in the context of the statutory framework 
as a whole.”  (Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 
478, 487.)  “If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its 
plain meaning controls.  If, however, the language supports 
more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to 
extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved 
and the legislative history.”  (Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority v. Alameda Produce Market, LLC 
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 1100, 1107.)  Considering the remedial nature 
of legislation meant to protect employees, we construe PAGA’s 
provisions broadly, in favor of this protection.  (See Williams, 
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 548; Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior 
Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1026-1027.) 
 
1. 
Statutory Language 
 
The plain language of section 2699(c) has only two 
requirements for PAGA standing.  The plaintiff must be an 
aggrieved employee, that is, someone “who was employed by the 
alleged violator” and “against whom one or more of the alleged 
violations was committed.”  (§ 2699(c).)  Both requirements 
derive from readily ascertainable facts, and both are satisfied 
here.  Kim was employed by Reins and alleged that he 
personally suffered at least one Labor Code violation on which 
the PAGA claim is based.  Kim is thus an “aggrieved employee” 
with standing to pursue penalties on the state’s behalf. 
 
Reins concedes Kim had PAGA standing when he sued but 
contends the standing somehow ended when Kim settled his 
claims for individual relief.  Reins argues PAGA standing is 



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KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
premised on a plaintiff’s injury.  In its view, “Whether someone 
has representative standing under PAGA depends on whether 
the employee has a continuing injury to redress via the PAGA 
mechanism, through the time of judgment. . . .  Once the injury 
has been redressed through settlement, . . . it is no longer a 
continuing injury capable of redress through PAGA.”  The 
argument fails because it is at odds with the language of the 
statute, the statutory purpose supporting PAGA claims, and the 
overall statutory scheme. 
 
Reins contends Kim is no longer an “aggrieved employee” 
because he accepted compensation for his injury.  The logic here 
is illusive.  The Legislature defined PAGA standing in terms of 
violations, not injury.  Kim became an aggrieved employee, and 
had PAGA standing, when one or more Labor Code violations 
were committed against him.  (See § 2699(c).)  Settlement did 
not nullify these violations.  The remedy for a Labor Code 
violation, through settlement or other means, is distinct from 
the fact of the violation itself.  For example, employers can pay 
an additional hour of wages as a remedy for failing to provide 
meal and rest breaks.  (§ 226.7, subd. (c).)  But we have held that 
payment of this statutory remedy “does not excuse a 
section 226.7 violation.”  (Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc. 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1244, 1256, italics added.) 
 
Further, Reins’s assertion that a PAGA plaintiff is no 
longer “aggrieved” once individual claims are resolved is at odds 
with the Legislature’s explicit definition.  Section 2699(c) 
defines an “aggrieved employee” as “any person who was 
employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more 
of the alleged violations was committed.”  It does not require the 
employee to claim that any economic injury resulted from the 
alleged violations.  “ ‘ “When a statute prescribes the meaning 



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KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
to be given to particular terms used by it, that meaning is 
generally binding on the courts.” ’ ”  (Security Pacific National 
Bank v. Wozab (1990) 51 Cal.3d 991, 998.)  Reins’s use of 
“aggrieved” as synonymous with having an unredressed injury 
is at odds with the statutory definition. 4 
 
Reins’s interpretation would add an expiration element to 
the statutory definition of standing.  It would expand 
section 2699(c) to provide that an employee who accepts a 
settlement for individual damage claims is no longer aggrieved.  
Of course, the Legislature  said no such thing.  In construing a 
statute, we are “ ‘careful not to add requirements to those 
already supplied by the Legislature.’ ”  (Ennabe v. Manosa 
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 697, 719.)  “ ‘ “Where the words of the statute 
are clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a 
purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from 
its legislative history.” ’ ”  (Ibid.; see Vasquez v. State of 
California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 253.)  If the Legislature 
intended to limit PAGA standing to employees with unresolved 
compensatory claims when such claims have been alleged, it 
could have worded the statute accordingly.  “That it did not 
                                        
4   
Reins accords too much significance to language in our 
prior opinions observing that PAGA standing requires the 
plaintiff to have suffered “harm” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
p. 558) or “injury” (Amalgamated Transit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at 
p. 1001) from the employer’s wrongful conduct.  Of course, “cases 
are not authority for propositions that are not considered.”  
(California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources 
Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1043.)  Read in context, these 
terms were simply shorthand for the requirement that a PAGA 
representative be someone “against whom one or more of the 
alleged violations was committed.”  (§ 2699(c).)  



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KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
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implies no such . . . requirement was intended.”  (Williams, 
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 546.) 
 
The statutory language reflects that the Legislature did 
not intend to link PAGA standing to the maintenance of 
individual claims when such claims have been alleged.  An 
employee has PAGA standing if “one or more of the alleged 
violations was committed” against him.  (§ 2699(c), italics 
added.)  This language indicates that PAGA standing is not 
inextricably linked to the plaintiff’s own injury.  Employees who 
were subjected to at least one unlawful practice have standing 
to serve as PAGA representatives even if they did not personally 
experience each and every alleged violation.  (§ 2699(c).)  This 
expansive approach to standing serves the state’s interest in 
vigorous enforcement.  (See Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 980 -
981.) 
 
Consistent with our interpretation of standing, two recent 
decisions have concluded that a plaintiff’s inability to obtain 
individual relief is not necessarily fatal to the maintenance of a 
PAGA claim.  In Raines v. Coastal Pacific Food Distributors, Inc. 
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 667, 670, the plaintiff sought statutory 
and civil penalties for a failure to provide accurate wage 
statements.  (§ 226, subd. (a).)  The court concluded the 
individual claim was properly dismissed because the plaintiff 
failed to show a quantifiable injury from the violation (see § 226, 
subd. (e)), but it was error to dismiss the related PAGA claim 
because injury is not a requirement for civil penalties.  (Raines, 
at pp. 678-680.)  Rejecting the notion “that ‘ “no injury” amounts 
to “no violation” ’ ” (id. at p. 680), the court explained that 
“damages and civil penalties have different purposes . . . .  
Damages are intended to be compensatory, to make one whole.  
[Citation.]  Accordingly, there must be an injury to compensate.  



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KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
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On the other hand, ‘Civil penalties, like punitive damages, are 
intended to punish the wrongdoer and to deter future 
misconduct.’  [Citation.]  An act may be wrongful and subject to 
civil penalties even if it does not result in injury.”  (Id. at p. 681.)  
Similarly, in Lopez v. Friant & Associates, LLC (2017) 15 
Cal.App.5th 773, 784-785, the plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the 
requirements 
for 
individual 
relief 
under 
section 226, 
subdivision (e) did not defeat his PAGA claim for civil penalties.  
The court observed that a PAGA claim is not “derivative of, or 
dependent on” an individual claim for relief.  (Lopez, at p. 786.) 
 
2. 
Statutory Purpose 
 
As noted, PAGA claims are different from conventional 
civil suits.  The Legislature’s sole purpose in enacting PAGA was 
“to augment the limited enforcement capability of the [LWDA] 
by empowering employees to enforce the Labor Code as 
representatives of the Agency.”  (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 
p. 383; see id. at pp. 388-389.)  Accordingly, a PAGA claim is an 
enforcement action between the LWDA and the employer, with 
the PAGA plaintiff acting on behalf of the government.  (Id. at 
pp. 382-384.)  The state can deputize anyone it likes to pursue 
its claim, including a plaintiff who has suffered no actual injury.  
(See id. at p. 382.)  Moreover, civil penalties recovered on the 
state’s behalf are intended to “remediate present violations and 
deter future ones,” not to redress employees’ injuries.  (Williams, 
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 546; see Iskanian, at p. 381; Brown, supra, 
197 Cal.App.4th at p. 501.) 
 
Although representative in nature, a PAGA claim is not 
simply a collection of individual claims for relief, and so is 
different from a class action.  The latter is a procedural device 
for aggregating claims “when the parties are numerous, and it 



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is impracticable to bring them all before the court.”  (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 382.)  In a class action, the “representative plaintiff still 
possesses only a single claim for relief—the plaintiff’s own.”  
(Watkins v. Wachovia Corp. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1576, 1589 
(Watkins).)  If a representative plaintiff voluntarily settles her 
claim, she no longer has an interest in the class action and may 
lose the ability to represent the class. 5   (Watkins, at p. 1592; see 
Wallace v. GEICO General Ins. Co., supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 1400-1401.)  “But a representative action under PAGA is not 
a class action.”  (Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. 
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 745, 757 (Huff).)  There is no individual 
component to a PAGA action because “ ‘every PAGA action . . . is 
a representative action on behalf of the state.’ ”  (Iskanian, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 387.)  Plaintiffs may bring a PAGA claim 
only as the state’s designated proxy, suing on behalf of all 
affected employees.  (See Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986; 
Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123-1124.) 
                                        
5   
Courts have distinguished between voluntary and 
involuntary settlements as a means of addressing the “pick off” 
problem.  The problem arises when a defendant pays the full 
amount of the named plaintiff’s individual claim, then seeks 
dismissal of the class action on the ground that the named 
plaintiff is no longer part of the class.  (Watkins, supra, 172 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1589.)  By this tactic, “the defendant seeks to 
avoid exposure to the class action by ‘picking off’ the named 
plaintiff, sometimes . . . serially.”  (Ibid.)  However, both 
California and federal courts “have concluded that the 
involuntary receipt of relief does not, of itself, prevent the class 
plaintiff from continuing as a class representative.”  (Id. at 
p. 1590; see Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper (1980) 445 
U.S. 326, 332-333, 339; Wallace v. GEICO General Ins. Co. 
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1398-1399.) 



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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
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Reins’s injury-based view of standing would deprive many 
employees of the ability to prosecute PAGA claims, contrary to 
the statute’s purpose to ensure effective code enforcement.  
“Hurdles that impede the effective prosecution of representative 
PAGA 
actions 
undermine 
the 
Legislature’s 
objectives.”  
(Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 548.) 
 
3. 
Statutory Context 
 
Reins’s interpretation also runs counter to the broader 
statutory scheme.  (See Poole v. Orange County Fire Authority 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1378, 1384-1385.)  “ ‘[W]e do not construe 
statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute “with 
reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that 
the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.” ’ ”  
(Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276.)  
 
 
a. 
Other PAGA Provisions 
 
“Aggrieved employee” is a term of art in PAGA.  It governs 
not just who has standing to bring a PAGA claim, but also who 
may recover a share of penalties and how those penalties are 
calculated.  Reins’s interpretation of the term would seriously 
impair the state’s ability to collect and distribute civil penalties 
under these provisions. 
 
Section 2699, subdivision (f)(2) calculates the amount of 
civil penalties based on the number of violations per pay period 
“for each aggrieved employee.”  If plaintiffs who settle individual 
claims are no longer considered “aggrieved employees,” as Reins 
asserts, violations against them would no longer be included in 
this calculation.  As a result, the state’s recovery in future PAGA 
suits, or through its own suit, would be diminished.  Employers 
could potentially avoid paying any penalties to the state simply 
by settling with the individual employees.  And these individual 



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settlements would not be subject to the safeguards of PAGA 
settlements, which require notice to the LWDA and court 
oversight.  (See § 2699, subd. (l)(2).) 
 
Additionally, 
because 
section 2699, 
subdivision (i) 
provides that 25 percent of civil penalties recovered are to be 
distributed to “aggrieved employees,” plaintiffs who settle 
individual claims would not be eligible to receive a share of 
penalties, even if their settlements specifically excluded 
compensation for civil penalties that would otherwise be due.  
Thus, beyond considerations of standing, Reins’s interpretation 
would allow employers to reduce their liability for civil 
penalties, without state oversight and contrary to PAGA’s goal 
of strengthening Labor Code enforcement.  (See Arias, supra, 46 
Cal.4th at p. 980.) 
 
 
b. 
Stand-Alone PAGA Claims 
 
Reins’s suggestion that Kim must maintain his individual 
claim for relief to retain PAGA standing also conflicts with 
plaintiffs’ recognized ability to bring stand-alone PAGA claims.  
Section 2699, subdivision (g)(1) states that “[n]othing in this 
part shall operate to limit an employee’s right to pursue or 
recover other remedies available under state or federal law, 
either separately or concurrently with an action taken under this 
part” (italics added).  This provision expressly authorizes PAGA 
suits brought “separately” from individual claims for relief.  
(§ 2699, subd. (g)(1).)  Indeed, many PAGA actions consist of a 
single cause of action seeking civil penalties.  Appellate courts 
have rejected efforts to split PAGA claims into individual and 
representative components.  (See, e.g., Zakaryan v. The Men’s 
Wearhouse, 
Inc. 
(2019) 
33 
Cal.App.5th 
659, 
671-672, 
disapproved on another ground in ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court 



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KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 196, fn. 8; Perez v. U-Haul Co. of California 
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 408, 420-421.)  Standing for these PAGA -
only cases cannot be dependent on the maintenance of an 
individual claim because individual relief has not been sought. 
 
 
c. 
Penalty Provisions Without a Private Right of 
 
 
 
Action 
 
Premising PAGA standing on the existence of an 
unredressed injury would also be inconsistent with numerous 
Labor Code statutes that impose civil penalties without 
affording a private right of action.  The Legislature authorized 
PAGA actions for a broad range of Labor Code violations.  (See 
§ 2699.5.)  While these statutes all describe prohibited conduct, 
many do not authorize individual damage suits by employees.  
“ ‘[W]hen regulatory statutes provide a comprehensive scheme 
for enforcement by an administrative agency,’ ” as with the 
Labor Code, “ ‘courts ordinarily conclude that the Legislature 
intended the administrative remedy to be exclusive unless the 
statutory language or legislative history clearly indicates an 
intent to create a private right of action.’ ”  (Thurman v. 
Bayshore Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 
1112, 1132, disapproved on another ground in ZB, N.A. v. 
Superior Court, supra,  8 Cal.5th at p. 196, fn. 8.)  Decisions 
examining specific Labor Code provisions enforceable under 
PAGA have frequently concluded that the statutes in question 
do not support a private right to sue.  Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens 
Casino, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 592, 601, for example, held there 
is no private right of action under section 351, which prohibits 
employers from taking employees’ tips.  (Lu, at p. 601.)  Nor can 
employees misclassified as independent contractors sue for 
relief directly under section 226.8.  (Noe v. Superior Court (2015) 
237 Cal.App.4th 316, 337-341; cf. Thurman, at p. 1132 [no 



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private right of action for employees to enforce an Industrial 
Welfare Commission wage order].)  Most recently, we concluded 
employees have no private right of action to pursue unpaid 
wages under section 558.  (ZB, at p. 188.) 
 
The availability of civil penalties for statutes that provide 
no individual relief highlights the flaw in Reins’s conception of 
PAGA standing.  In Reins’s view, PAGA standing requires that 
the plaintiff have an unredressed injury.  But plaintiffs cannot 
address a claimed injury by private suit unless the statute 
permits it.  The concept of injury is especially inapposite in this 
context.  Requiring the existence of an unredressed injury to 
support standing would be problematic for PAGA suits to 
enforce the many Labor Code statutes that do not create a 
private right to sue.  Indeed, the very reason the Legislature 
enacted PAGA was to enhance enforcement of provisions 
punishable only through government-initiated proceedings.  
(See Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 379; Arias, supra, 46 
Cal.4th at pp. 980-981.)  Reins’s formulation of standing would 
contravene this remedial purpose.  
 
4. 
Legislative History 
 
Although the meaning of PAGA’s standing requirement is 
plain, the parties have advanced several arguments based on 
legislative history.  An examination of these matters further 
supports our conclusion that PAGA standing is not lost when 
representatives settle their claims for individual relief. 6 
                                        
6   
The parties and amici curiae also assert numerous policy 
arguments.  However, we are called upon to interpret 
section 2699(c) as written.  Where, as here, the statutory 
language, purpose, and context all point to the same 
interpretation, policy arguments that the statute should have 



[PDF page 17]
KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
 
The original draft of the bill that enacted PAGA 
authorized the recovery of civil penalties by an “aggrieved 
employee” but did not define that term.  (Sen. Bill No. 796 (2003 -
2004 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 21, 2003.)  Employer groups 
objected that PAGA would be vulnerable to the same abuses 
recently exposed under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL; Bus. 
& Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.).  (See Sen. Judiciary Com., 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 796 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
Apr. 22, 2003, p. 7 (Senate Judiciary Committee Analysis).)  
“California law previously authorized any person acting for the 
general public to sue for relief from unfair competition.”  
(Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 223, 227 (Californians for Disability Rights).)  However, 
some private attorneys had “exploited the generous standing 
requirement of the UCL” by filing “ ‘shakedown’ suits to extort 
money from small businesses” for minor or technical violations 
where no client had suffered an actual injury.  (In re Tobacco II 
Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 316; see Californians for Disability 
Rights, at p. 228.)  In response to this practice and to ensure that 
PAGA suits could not be brought by “persons who suffered no 
harm from the alleged wrongful act” (Senate Judiciary 
Committee Analysis, p. 7), the sponsors added the definition of 
“aggrieved employee” that now appears in section 2699(c).  (See 
Sen. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 796 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) May 1, 
2003, § 2; Senate Judiciary Committee Analysis, pp. 7-8; Assem. 
Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 796 (2003-2004 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended May 12, 2003, p. 4; Assem. Com. on Labor 
                                        
been written differently are more appropriately addressed to the 
Legislature. 



[PDF page 18]
KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
and Employment, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 796 (2003-2004 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended July 2, 2003, p. 4.) 
 
Reins and its supporting amici curiae contend this history 
illustrates a legislative intent to restrict PAGA standing to 
plaintiffs with some “redressable injury.”  It is apparent that 
PAGA’s standing requirement was meant to be a departure from 
the “general public” (Californians for Disability Rights, supra, 
39 Cal.4th at p. 227) standing originally allowed under the UCL.  
However, Reins reads too much into this objective.  Nothing in 
the legislative history suggests the Legislature intended to 
make PAGA standing dependent on the existence of an 
unredressed injury, or the maintenance of a separate, 
unresolved claim.  Such a condition would have severely 
curtailed PAGA’s availability to police Labor Code violations 
because, as noted, many provisions do not create private rights 
of action or require an allegation of quantifiable injury.  Instead, 
true to PAGA’s remedial purpose, the Legislature conferred 
fairly broad standing on all plaintiffs who were employed by the 
violator and subjected to at least one alleged violation.  Reins’s 
narrower construction would thwart the Legislature’s clear 
intent to deputize employees to pursue sanctions on the state’s 
behalf.  (See Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 388; Huff, supra, 
23 Cal.App.5th at p. 756.) 
B. 
Preclusive Effect of an Individual Claim’s Dismissal 
 
Apart from its statutory interpretation arguments, Reins 
also contends principles of claim preclusion and retraxit bar 
Kim from litigating the PAGA claim.  Not so. 
 
The claim preclusion doctrine, formerly called res 
judicata, “prohibits a second suit between the same parties on 
the same cause of action.”  (Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. 



[PDF page 19]
KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 792 (Boeken).)  “Claim preclusion arises 
if a second suit involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between 
the same parties (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the 
first suit.”  (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 
813, 824 (DKN Holdings).)  “Retraxit” describes the particular 
application of claim preclusion to a claim that has been 
dismissed with prejudice.  (See Rice v. Crow (2000) 81 
Cal.App.4th 725, 733-734.)  A dismissal with prejudice is 
considered a judgment on the merits preventing subsequent 
litigation between the parties on the dismissed claim.  (Federal 
Home Loan Bank of San Francisco v. Countrywide Financial 
Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1520, 1527; Torrey Pines Bank v. 
Superior Court (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 813, 820.) 
 
It is unnecessary to address the preclusion elements in 
detail because Kim’s settlement specifically excluded the 
pending PAGA claim.  Even as to claims that might otherwise 
be barred, “ ‘parties may by agreement limit the legal effect of a 
dismissal with prejudice so that it would not constitute a 
retraxit and affect their rights in a later pending action.’ ”  
(Legendary Investors Group No. 1, LLC v. Niemann (2014) 224 
Cal.App.4th 1407, 1411.)  Where a settlement agreement 
expressly excludes certain claims, the resulting dismissal does 
not preclude further litigation on the excluded claim.  (See ibid.)  
Reins’s preclusion argument stumbles at this threshold and is 
inconsistent with the very agreement it made. 7 
                                        
7   
Reins’s conduct below is troubling.  Reins conceded Kim’s 
PAGA claim had to be stayed in superior court while the other 
claims were arbitrated.  It then settled the arbitrable claims 
with an offer that encompassed only Kim’s “individual claims.”  
Indeed, Reins’s one-page offer mentions Kim’s individual claims 
three times.  When Kim returned to court to litigate the PAGA 



[PDF page 20]
KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
 
Moreover, Reins attempts to apply preclusion principles to 
claims within the same lawsuit, yet we have consistently 
described claim preclusion as a bar to claims brought in a 
“second suit.”  (E.g., DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824; 
Boeken, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 792; Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto 
Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.)  The doctrine “promotes judicial 
economy” because “all claims based on the same cause of action 
must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they 
may not be raised at a later date.”  (Mycogen Corp., at p. 897.)  
Kim did not attempt to split his claims against Reins or 
relitigate claims that had been previously resolved.  His single 
complaint encompassed seven causes of action.  The six claims 
for specific Labor Code violations were bifurcated and sent to 
arbitration at Reins’s own urging.  The seventh claim seeking 
PAGA penalties was stayed pending completion of the 
arbitration.  The PAGA claim was never resolved.  Indeed, 
consistent with the settlement agreement, Kim’s request for 
dismissal of the individual claims specified that “Cause of Action 
Seven for penalties pursuant to Lab. Code § 2699 et seq. 
(‘PAGA’) for the underlying violations . . . shall remain.”  Reins 
                                        
claim, which the parties had specifically carved out of the 
settlement, Reins argued Kim had lost standing.  Even if Reins’s 
prior conduct did not amount to an estoppel, this turnabout was 
hardly fair play.  Moreover, Reins made its settlement offer 
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998.  If Kim had 
rejected the offer and failed to obtain a more favorable award in 
arbitration, he would have been liable for his own costs and all 
costs Reins incurred after making the offer.  (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 998, subd. (c)(1).)  Under the arguments Reins now advances, 
section 998 offers would present employees like Kim with a 
Hobson’s choice:  either reject the offer and risk incurring 
substantial liability for costs or accept the offer and lose the 
ability to pursue the PAGA claim. 



[PDF page 21]
KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
cites no authority, and we are aware of none, holding that the 
resolution of some claims can bar the litigation of other claims 
that were asserted in the same lawsuit. 
 
Reins’s reliance on Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. (2010) 
189 Cal.App.4th 562 is likewise unavailing.  In Villacres, an 
employer settled a class action seeking recovery for several 
Labor Code violations and civil penalties under section 558.  
Two days after the settlement, a class member brought a PAGA 
claim for penalties under additional statutes.  (Villacres, at 
p. 569.)  The court held claim preclusion barred this second suit 
because the “PAGA claims could have been raised in the prior 
action.”  (Id. at p. 584.)  Generally speaking, a prior judgment 
between the same parties “is res judicata on matters which were 
raised or could have been raised, on matters litigated or 
litigable.”  (Sutphin v. Speik (1940) 15 Cal.2d 195, 202.)  But, 
even assuming Villacres was correctly decided, the situation 
here is obviously distinguishable.  Kim did not attempt to 
litigate his claims piecemeal.  He joined all claims against Reins, 
including one for PAGA penalties, in a single action.  Claim 
preclusion does not apply under these circumstances. 
 
 



[PDF page 22]
KIM v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The Court of Appeal judgment is reversed, and the case is 
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the PAGA 
cause of action. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
We Concur: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.   
GROBAN, J. 



[PDF page 23]
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 18 Cal.App.5th 1052  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S246911 
Date Filed:  March 12, 2020  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Kenneth R. Freeman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Kingsley & Kingsley, Eric B. Kingsley, Ari J. Stiller and Lyubov Lerner for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Cynthia L. Rice and Javier J. Castro for California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., California Rural Legal 
Assistance Foundation, California Employment Lawyers Association, Consumer Attorneys of California 
and Asian Americans Advancing Justice-LA as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Capstone Law, Ryan H. Wu, Melissa Grant and John E. Stobart for Bet Tzedek as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Spencer C. Skeen, Tim L. Johnson, Jesse C. 
Ferrantella and Jonathan H. Liu for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Davis Wright Tremaine, Rochelle L. Wilcox, Janet L. Grumer and Aaron N. Colby for Restaurant Law 
Center, California Restaurant Association and Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Fine, Boggs & Perkins, John P. Boggs and Cory J. King for California New Car Dealers Association as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Barbara J. Miller, John D. Hayashi and Thomas M. Peterson for The Employers 
Group as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Blank Rome, Laura Reathaford and Natalie Alameddine for Association of Southern California Defense 
Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 



[PDF page 24]
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Eric B. Kingsley 
Kingsley & Kingsley, APC 
16133 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1200 
Encino, CA 91436 
(818) 990-8300 
 
Spencer C. Skeen 
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 
4370 La Jolla Village Drive, Suite 990 
San Diego, CA 92122 
(858) 652-3100