Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001

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Filed 12/30/24 
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION  
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
 
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
 
DIVISION ONE 
 
CHRISTINA LEEPER, 
 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
SHIPT, INC., et al., 
 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
   B339670 
 
   (Los Angeles County 
   Super. Ct. No. 24STCV06485) 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County, Daniel S. Murphy, Judge.  Reversed with 
directions. 
 
Seyfarth Shaw, Camille A. Olson, Candace Bertoldi, 
Richard B. Lapp and Christopher A. Crosman for Defendants and 
Appellants. 
 
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, Daniel M. 
Hutchinson, Michelle A. Lamy and Faith E. A. Lewis for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 



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Shipt, Inc. (Shipt) and its parent company Target 
Corporation (Target) (collectively, appellants) appeal from an 
order denying their motion to compel arbitration in an action 
brought against them by respondent Christina Leeper under the 
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) 
(PAGA). 1   The court denied the motion on the basis that Leeper’s 
PAGA action did not allege any individual claims subject to 
arbitration under the parties’ arbitration agreement. 
Based on the unambiguous, ordinary meaning of the 
relevant statutory language and the legislative history of 
that language, however, we conclude that every PAGA action 
necessarily includes an individual PAGA claim. 2   Accordingly, 
we reverse and direct the court to enter a new order 
(1) compelling the parties to arbitrate Leeper’s individual 
PAGA claim and (2) staying the representative PAGA claim 
portion of the lawsuit. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
A. 
The Arbitration Agreement Between Leeper 
and Appellants 
Shipt is an online ordering platform whose members 
arrange for Shipt “[s]hoppers” to purchase and provide delivery 
of goods from local merchants.  On March 19, 2019, Leeper 
entered into an independent contractor agreement with Shipt to 
provide services as a Shipt shopper.  The independent contractor 
 
1  Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory 
references are to the Labor Code.  
2  See pages 6–7, post, regarding our use of the terminology 
“individual PAGA claim” and “representative PAGA claim.”   



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agreement references and incorporates a separate arbitration 
agreement Leeper and Shipt also executed. 
The arbitration agreement obligates Leeper and 
appellants 3  to “resolve[ ] through mandatory, binding 
arbitration” “any and all disputes, claims, or controversies 
of any kind and nature between [them].”  The arbitration 
agreement also delegates to the arbitrator several threshold 
issues, including “disputes about whether any claims, 
controversies, or disputes between us are subject to arbitration” 
and “claims . . . regarding the scope, interpretation, validity, 
and enforceability of any Independent Contractor Arbitration 
Agreement or this Arbitration Agreement.”  Appellants refer 
to these provisions as the “delegation clause.”  
The agreement “is made pursuant to a transaction 
involving interstate commerce and shall be governed by 
the Federal Arbitration Act [(FAA)].” 
B. 
Leeper’s Lawsuit Against Appellants  
On March 14, 2024, Leeper filed a complaint against 
appellants styled as a “representative complaint for injunctive 
and declaratory relief, civil penalties, and other relief under 
[PAGA].”  (Capitalization omitted.)  The complaint alleges Shipt 
“misclassified [Leeper] and other similarly situated [w]orkers as 
independent contractors and, in so doing, has violated multiple 
provisions of the . . . Labor Code.”  Leeper is alleged to qualify 
as “an ‘aggrieved employee’ ” under PAGA, because she was 
“employed by Shipt during the applicable statutory period and 
suffered the Labor Code violations alleged [in the complaint].” 
 
3  The arbitration agreement states that it applies to Shipt 
and, inter alia, any of Shipt’s “affiliates or parents.” 



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4 
On these bases, Leeper alleged a single count for “[PAGA] 
non-individual penalties.”  (Capitalization omitted.)  Leeper 
alleged that she “[brought] this PAGA action on a representative, 
non-individual basis” and “in [her] representative capacity as 
an aggrieved employee on behalf of the [s]tate and all similarly 
aggrieved individuals subjected to the [alleged] violations.”  
Leeper alleged her “claim is typical of the claims of the others 
whom [she] seeks to represent” and that “[her] claims are 
representative of and co-extensive with the claims of the 
other aggrieved individuals.”  She sought “non-individual 
civil penalties” and “non-individual injunctive and declaratory 
relief.”  In the complaint, Leeper also addressed the arbitration 
agreement as follows:  “Because [Leeper] alleges only non -
individual PAGA claims on a representative basis, Shipt cannot 
compel them to arbitrat[ion].” 
On May 14, 2024, appellants filed a motion to compel 
arbitration of the individual portion of Leeper’s PAGA action 
and, under the delegation clause, any disputes regarding the 
enforceability of the arbitration agreement. 4   In her opposition, 
Leeper argued she had not alleged any individual claims, and 
thus there was nothing to compel to arbitration.  She did not 
respond to appellants’ argument that the agreement delegated 
 
4  Before appellants filed this motion, the parties’ counsel 
exchanged emails regarding their differing views about the 
applicability of the arbitration agreement to Leeper’s lawsuit.  
Leeper contends in the factual background section of her brief 
to this court that this correspondence did not satisfy, and that 
appellants in no other way satisfied, the requirement that they 
meet and confer regarding their motion to compel.  Leeper does 
not present any legal argument that this is a basis for affirming 
the court’s order on appeal. 



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to the arbitrator any questions regarding the arbitrability 
of disputes or the enforcement of the agreement.  Appellants’ 
motion further sought a stay of the litigation pending arbitration, 
which Leeper also opposed. 
The trial court denied the motion on the basis that “[the] 
action [was] solely a representative PAGA suit without any 
individual causes of action” and “[a]s such, the [c]ourt [had] 
no individual cause of action it may compel to arbitration.” 
This appeal followed. 
DISCUSSION 
A. 
General Legal Framework Under PAGA  
“Informed by findings of pervasive underenforcement 
of many Labor Code provisions and ‘a shortage of government 
resources to pursue enforcement,’ the Legislature enacted PAGA 
to create new civil penalties for Labor Code violations and ‘ “to 
allow aggrieved employees, acting as private attorneys general, 
to recover [those] penalties.” ’  [Citation.]  Specifically, PAGA 
authorizes ‘an aggrieved employee,’ acting as a proxy or agent 
of the state Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA), 
to bring a civil action against an employer ‘on behalf of himself 
or herself and other current or former employees’ to recover 
civil penalties for Labor Code violations they have sustained.”  
(Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1113 
(Adolph), quoting § 2699, subd. (a).)  This definition of a PAGA 
action is contained in section 2699, subdivision (a).  Section 2699, 
subdivision (c)(1) addresses what a plaintiff must establish in 
order to be an “aggrieved employee” with standing to bring a 



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PAGA action. 5   (See §§ 2699, subds. (a) & (c); see Adolph, supra, 
14 Cal.5th at p. 1121.)  Here, we are concerned with what a 
PAGA action entails as defined by section 2699, subdivision (a), 
and not standing. 
All PAGA actions are inherently representative in that 
a PAGA plaintiff is always acting as a proxy for the LWDA and 
collecting civil penalties on the LWDA’s behalf.  (See Viking River 
Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 648–649 (Viking 
River); Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1114.)  Such civil penalties 
are otherwise recoverable only by the LWDA, and a PAGA 
plaintiff must remit the majority collected in a PAGA action 
to the LWDA.  (§ 2699, subd. (m) [“civil penalties recovered by 
aggrieved employees shall be distributed as follows:  65 percent 
to the [LWDA] . . . and 35 percent to the aggrieved employees”].)  
By contrast, a plaintiff cannot recover civil penalties via a 
non-PAGA Labor Code claim; instead, such a claim may seek 
“statutory penalties” the LWDA is not entitled to collect.  (Kim, 
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 81.) 
A PAGA plaintiff is acting in a representative capacity 
in another way as well:  By asserting a PAGA claim based on 
violations that employees other than the plaintiff have suffered.  
(Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at pp. 648–649.)  In Viking River, 
the United States Supreme Court used the term “ ‘representative’ 
PAGA claim[ ]” to refer to this aspect of a PAGA action, and the 
 
5  Section 2699, subdivision (c)(1) defines such an aggrieved 
employee as “any person who was employed by the alleged 
violator and personally suffered each of the violations alleged.”  
(§ 2699, subd. (c)(1); see Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1121 [to 
have standing a plaintiff must show “that Labor Code violations 
were committed against [the plaintiff] while [the plaintiff] was 
employed by [the defendant]”].) 



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term “ ‘individual PAGA claim’ ” to refer to a portion of a PAGA 
action that is “based on code violations suffered by the plaintiff.”  
(Id. at p. 649.)  The parties here employ similar terminology in 
their briefing, as did the California Supreme Court in a recent 
decision.  (See Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1114.)  We do 
so for the purposes of this decision as well. 
B. 
Leeper’s PAGA Action Alleges an Individual 
PAGA Claim 
Appellants argue that Leeper’s PAGA action includes an 
individual PAGA claim on Leeper’s behalf, 6  and thus is not, as 
Leeper contends and the trial court concluded, a PAGA action 
brought in a purely representative capacity on behalf of other 
employees. 7   We agree with appellants. 
1. 
Statutory Language Unambiguously 
Provides That Any PAGA Action Includes 
an Individual PAGA Claim 
Appellants argue that a necessary component of every 
PAGA action is an individual PAGA claim, and thus that Leeper, 
 
6  Leeper characterizes appellants’ argument as 
asserting that she “should have brought individual claims 
in order to establish standing to sue.”  We disagree with this 
characterization of appellants’ argument. 
7  As noted, for the purposes of this appeal, in referring to 
aspects of a PAGA action as “individual” or “representative,” we 
are setting aside—as have recent decisions of the United States 
and California Supreme Courts in their use of these terms—
that all aspects of a PAGA action are inherently representative 
because the plaintiff acts on behalf of the LWDA.  We thus 
recognize that even what we refer to as “individual PAGA claims” 
are, in this sense, representative. 



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having alleged a cause of action under PAGA has, as a matter of 
law, alleged both an individual claim and a representative claim.  
Because this presents a question of statutory interpretation, 
our review is de novo. 8   (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1120.) 
“In construing a statute, our task is to ascertain the 
intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the 
enactment.”  (Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 
478, 487.)  The first step in this endeavor is always looking 
to “the words of the statute, which are the most reliable 
indications of the Legislature’s intent.”  (Ibid.)  In pertinent 
part, section 2699, subdivision (a) describes a PAGA claim 
as “a civil action brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf 
of the employee and other current or former employees.” 9  
The unambiguous and ordinary meaning of the word “and” 
 
8  Because we find this argument dispositive, we do not 
reach appellants’ alternative argument that, even if every PAGA 
action does not necessarily include an individual claim, Leeper’s 
complaint alleges such an individual PAGA claim.  We also 
do not reach the issue, about which the parties disagree, of the 
appropriate standard of review for assessing this alternative 
argument. 
9  The full description of a PAGA action in section 2699, 
subdivision (a) is as follows:  “Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, any provision of this code that provides for a 
civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the [LWDA] or any 
of its departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies, 
or employees, for a violation of this code, may, as an alternative, 
be recovered through a civil action brought by an aggrieved 
employee on behalf of the employee and other current or former 
employees against whom a violation of the same provision was 
committed pursuant to the [notice and fee] procedures specified 
in Section 2699.3.” 



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is conjunctive, not disjunctive.  Thus, the clause “on behalf of 
the employee and other current or former employees” (§ 2699, 
subd. (a), italics added) means that the action described 
has both an individual claim component (plaintiff ’s action on 
behalf of the plaintiff himself or herself) and a representative 
component (plaintiff ’s action on behalf of other aggrieved 
employees). 
Leeper argues that another part of the statute trumps 
the plain meaning of this conjunctive language and allows the 
individual employee the option of bringing only a representative 
claim.  Namely, she points to language in section 2699 stating 
that civil penalties “to be assessed and collected by the 
[LWDA] . . . for a violation of this code, may, as an alternative, 
be recovered through a civil action brought by an aggrieved 
employee on behalf of the employee and other current or former 
employees against whom a violation of the same provision was 
committed.”  (§ 2699, subd. (a), italics added.)  But this language 
is referring to PAGA actions seeking civil penalties otherwise 
only recoverable by the LWDA as an alternative to the LWDA 
itself collecting those penalties.  (See Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 
pp. 80–81.) 
Leeper also cites language in section 2699, 
subdivision (k)(1) providing:  “Nothing in [PAGA] shall 
operate to limit an employee’s right to pursue or recover other 
remedies available under state or federal law, either separately 
or concurrently with an action taken under [PAGA].”  By its 
own terms, this refers to non-PAGA claims—i.e., “other remedies” 
besides those set forth in PAGA.  (§ 2699, subd. (k)(1).)  It thus 
speaks to the right of a PAGA plaintiff to bring a non-PAGA 
individual claim or a class action claim seeking statutory 



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penalties to compensate the plaintiff or class of plaintiffs—
not civil penalties largely payable to the LWDA—in addition 
to a PAGA claim.  (See Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 88.) 
Accordingly, based on the unambiguous language in 
section 2699, subdivision (a), any PAGA action necessarily 
includes both an individual PAGA claim and a representative 
PAGA claim.  Leeper’s interpretation would have us either excise 
the language “on behalf of the employee” or interpret the word 
“and” to mean “and/ or.”  (§ 2699, subd. (a).)  Doing either would 
be contrary to fundamental tenets of statutory construction that 
we assign the “statute’s words . . . their usual and ordinary 
meanings, and constru[e] them in context” (Wells v. One2One 
Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190 (Wells)), and 
that we not “render statutory language meaningless” (Plantier v. 
Ramona Municipal Water Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 372, 386). 
We recognize that the existence of an individual PAGA 
claim in every PAGA action means this claim often may be 
separately compelled to arbitration where the FAA applies 
(see Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 642), which may trigger 
a stay of the litigation of the representative PAGA claim (see 
Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4) and even potentially affect the outcome 
of that litigation via issue preclusion (see Rocha v. U-Haul Co. 
of California (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 65, 69).  But Leeper’s 
contention that this result contravenes public policy is not a 
ground for ignoring the unambiguous language of the PAGA 
statute.  (Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1190 [when statutory 
“words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the 
Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning 
governs”]; see ibid. [only “[i]n cases of uncertain meaning . . . we 



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may also consider the consequences of a particular interpretation, 
including its impact on public policy”].)  
In any case, statutory history supports our interpretation 
of what the Legislature intended.  Namely, legislative history 
reflects that the Legislature deliberately chose the word “and” 
and rejected the word “or” in the statutory description of a PAGA 
action as “a civil action . . . on behalf of [the plaintiff] and other 
current or former employees.”  (§ 2699, subd. (a), italics added.)  
Namely, the version of section 2699 in the originally proposed 
Senate bill used the phrase “a civil action . . . on behalf of himself 
or herself or other current or former employees.”  (Assem. Com. 
on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 796 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) 
as amended May 12, 2003, p. 8, italics added.)  In an “author’s 
technical amendment” to the initially proposed bill, “in order 
to clarify the intent of the bill and correct drafting errors,” 
the author replaced the word “or” with the word “and.”  (Ibid., 
capitalization omitted.)  The Legislature accepted this change 
without opposition, and it is reflected in the final version of 
the statute. 
2. 
PAGA Standing Decisions Leeper Cites 
Do Not Support a Different Result  
Leeper argues that two decisions of the California Supreme 
Court, Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th 73 and Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th 
1104, support her interpretation of the statute.  Leeper 
similarly relies on a recent decision of Division Six of this court, 
Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 
533 (Balderas).  But none of the cases she cites even speaks to the 
issue presented here—that is, the definition of a PAGA claim— 
nor does any interpret the statutory language at issue here. 



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a. 
The California Supreme Court’s Decision 
in Kim 
To support her proposed interpretation of PAGA, Leeper 
cites to language in Kim stating that the statute “expressly 
authorizes PAGA suits brought ‘separately’ from individual 
claims for relief ” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 88), and that the 
Legislature did not “intend[ ] to make PAGA standing dependent 
on . . . the maintenance of a separate, unresolved claim” (id. at 
pp. 90–91).  But this language refers to individual non-PAGA 
claims—not individual PAGA claims as we define and discuss 
them in this opinion, and as the California Supreme Court 
defined and discussed them in Adolph.  (See Adolph, supra, 
14 Cal.5th at p. 1114.)  Indeed, it was only after Viking River— 
which postdates Kim—that courts began discussing the 
possibility of splitting PAGA claims into individual and 
representative components that might be adjudicated in separate 
fora.  The plaintiff in Kim had settled “his own Labor Code 
claims against” the defendant seeking statutory penalties not 
recoverable under PAGA, and the question presented to the 
high court was whether that settlement of individual non-PAGA 
claims deprived him of standing to bring a PAGA action seeking 
civil penalties.  (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 82.)  The court 
concluded it did not.  Thus, the language in Kim that PAGA 
“expressly authorizes PAGA suits brought ‘separately’ from 
individual claims for relief . . . (§ 2699, subd. (g)(1) . . . )” (Kim, 
supra, at p. 88), and that the Legislature did not “intend[ ] to 
make PAGA standing dependent on . . . the maintenance of a 
separate, unresolved claim” (id. at pp. 90–91), is referring to 
individual non-PAGA claims.  It does not address individual 
PAGA claims and therefore does not guide our analysis. 



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Kim thus addressed only the question of standing, not the 
definition of a PAGA claim.  (See Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 80, 
fn. omitted [“[t]his case presents an issue of first impression:  
Do employees lose standing to pursue a claim under [PAGA] if 
they settle and dismiss their individual claims for Labor Code 
violations”] & id. at p. 82.)  Because the question of standing 
depends solely on whether a plaintiff is an aggrieved employee 
as defined by section 2699, subdivision (c)(1) (see Kim, supra, 
at pp. 83–84; accord, Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1116 & 
1120), Kim neither had occasion to interpret, nor did it interpret, 
section 2699, subdivision (a) defining what a PAGA action 
necessarily includes.   
b. 
The California Supreme Court’s Decision 
in Adolph  
Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th 1104, unlike Kim, does discuss 
individual PAGA claims.  The plaintiff had brought a PAGA 
action expressly including an individual PAGA claim component 
and a representative PAGA claim component.  The Supreme 
Court concluded the plaintiff ’s individual PAGA claim component 
could be adjudicated via arbitration without the plaintiff losing 
standing to pursue the remaining representative PAGA claim 
portion in court.  The Adolph court did not, therefore, have 
occasion to consider whether the plaintiff could have, from the 
beginning of his lawsuit, alleged only a representative PAGA 
claim.  Rather, like Kim, Adolph speaks only to the requirements 
for PAGA standing based on section 2699, subdivision (c)(1)—not 
the conceptually and legally distinct issue of what claims a PAGA 
action necessarily involves. 



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c. 
The Court of Appeal’s Decision in 
Balderas 
Finally, Leeper argues that Balderas, supra, 101 
Cal.App.5th 533, supports his position that a plaintiff may 
properly allege only a representative PAGA claim.  Balderas 
is another standing case, the holding of which addresses only 
PAGA standing issues and thus relies only on section 2699, 
subdivision (c)(1)’s definition of “aggrieved employee.”  Balderas 
did not have occasion to discuss, did not discuss, and its holding 
does not address, whether a plaintiff may carve out an individual 
PAGA claim from a PAGA action.  In arguing to the contrary, 
Leeper relies entirely on dicta in Balderas that may suggest 
the Court of Appeal accepted the plaintiff ’s and trial court’s 
characterization of PAGA claims as capable of being asserted 
on behalf of aggrieved employees other than the named plaintiff.  
(Balderas, supra, at p. 538.) 
In sum, neither Kim, Adolph, nor Balderas suggests 
we should—let alone requires that we must—reach the 
interpretation of section 2699, subdivision (a) proposed by 
Leeper. 
C. 
The Court Erred in Not Compelling Leeper’s 
Individual PAGA Claim to Arbitration and 
Staying the Litigation 
The only basis Leeper argues for affirming the order, 
and the only basis Leeper raised below in opposing the motion, 
was that her complaint did not allege any individual claim. 10  
 
10  Leeper does not contend that Leeper’s individual PAGA 
claim falls outside the scope of the arbitration agreement.  Nor 
does she deny the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.  
 



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Because we disagree, the court on remand must order plaintiff ’s 
individual PAGA claim to arbitration. 
Appellants further argue that the court should have stayed 
the portion of the litigation remaining in court.  We agree that 
the Code of Civil Procedure requires such a stay.  (See Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1281.4 [“if a court of competent jurisdiction, . . . has 
ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved 
in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this state, 
the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, 
upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the 
action or proceeding,” capitalization omitted & italics added].)  
The duration of the stay, however, remains within the court’s 
discretion.  (See ibid. [requiring such a stay “until an arbitration 
is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such 
earlier time as the court specifies”].) 
 
Accordingly, there is no need to address appellants’ arguments 
that the delegation clause requires the arbitrator to decide 
disputes regarding these issues. 



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DISPOSITION 
We reverse the court’s order.  We direct the court to issue a 
new order compelling the parties to arbitrate Leeper’s individual 
PAGA claim and staying litigation of the representative PAGA 
claim for an amount of time to be determined by the court. 
Appellants are awarded their costs on appeal. 
 
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. 
 
 
 
 
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. 
We concur: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WEINGART, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KLATCHKO, J. * 
 
*  Judge of the Riverside Superior Court, assigned by the 
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution.